ABSTRACT. Structural models that admit multiple reduced forms, such as game-theoretic models with multiple equilibria, pose challenges in practice, especially when parameters are set-identified and the identified set is large. In such cases, researchers often choose to focus on a particular subset of equilibria for counterfactual analysis, but this choice can be hard to justify. This paper proposes a refinement criterion for the identified set. Our criterion chooses a subset such that counterfactual predictions of outcomes are most stable against local perturbations of the reduced forms (e.g. the equilibrium selection rule). Our refinement has multiple appealing features, including an intuitive characterization, lower computational cost, and stable predictions. Focusing on moment inequality models, we propose bootstrap inference on the refinement and provide generic conditions under which the inference is uniformly asymptotically valid. We present and discuss results from our Monte Carlo study and an empirical application based on a model with top-coded data.
Introduction
Economists often use a structural model to analyze the effect of a policy that has never been implemented, such as potential mergers or changes to legislation. For such analysis, it is crucial to have a plausible specification of the causal relationship between the policy variable and the outcome variable of interest. However, a plausible specification can come short of determining the causal relationship uniquely. Prominent examples are found in game theoretic models, where the presence of multiple equilibria admits multiple reduced forms. (Tamer (2003) called models with multiple reduced forms incomplete.)
Such models pose challenge for counterfactual analysis, especially when the parameters are set-identified with a large identified set. It is not unusual that predictions from counterfactual analysis based on different equilibria yield self-contradictory results (Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2012), p.115) . In this situation, just as in the calibration approach in macroeconomics, it is not uncommon that the researcher chooses certain values of the parameters or a specific equilibrium to obtain a meaningful analysis.
1 However, such a choice, if not based on a priori guidance, can be hard to justify. When one chooses a subset of the identified set for prediction, it is reasonable to focus on one that produces most "reliable" counterfactual predictions. Predictions that are sensitive to a change of the aspects of the model that the researcher is not sure about cannot be reliable. Given that the researcher is often least sure about how a reduced form is determined in the data generating process, we propose using a subset of the identified set which produces counterfactual predictions that are robust to local perturbations of the reduced forms (e.g. local perturbations of the equilibrium selection rule in a game setting).
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More specifically, consider a causal relationship between endogenous variable y and exogenous variables x, ε: y = g β,γ (x, ε; η),
where β is the parameter of interest, γ a nuisance parameter, and η is a random variable with distribution G. Without observing η or knowing G, the model admits multiple reduced forms. For example, in the case of games with multiple equilibria, G plays the role of the equilibrium selection rule.
Suppose that the counterfactual setting of interest involves a counterfactual distributioñ F X for X. Consider the average structural function (ASF) (Blundell and Powell (2004) ):
ASF β,γ,G (x) = g β,γ (x, ε; η)dG(η|x, ε)dF ε (ε),
1
For example, in an entry model, Jia (2008) focuses on the equilibrium that is most profitable to one of the firms, and Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006) use an equilibrium selection rule which randomizes between a Pareto-best equilibrium and a Pareto-worst equilibrium with an unknown probability. Another example is Roberts and Sweeting (2013) in the context of auctions, who consider the particular equilibrium with the lowest signal for agents in the model so they enter the auction.
2
This echoes in spirit Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) when they said, "if the structural model will be used to predict a counterfactual policy, it seems reasonable that the model should be judged in terms of its ability to predict that particular policy. In this sense, the "best" model depends on the type of counterfactual policy one wants to predict...." (p.58).
where F ε denotes the distribution of ε, and G(·|x, ε) the conditional distribution of η given x and ε. Then our proposal is that we choose γ that minimizes sup G ∈B(G;δ)
where B(G; δ) denotes a neighborhood of G. We call the resulting set of values (β, γ) in the identified set the Locally Robust Refinement (LRR) . In many set-ups, the LRR is a substantially smaller set than the identified set, and can produce informative results from a counterfactual analysis with a much smaller computational cost.
3 Furthermore, the LRR is often very intuitive. For example, the LRR in an entry game picks nuisance parameter values that minimize the region of multiple equilibria, as we show in Section 3. The formulation in (2) gives the impression that the LRR involves additional optimization over an infinite dimensional space in estimation, adding to computational cost. Using the linearity of ASF β,γ,G (x) in G and Hilbert space geometry, this paper gives a simple characterization of the LRR so that focusing on the LRR does not cause extra computational cost. In fact, due to the additional constraints that come from the LRR, the computational cost is substantially reduced from a benchmark case without using the LRR. Furthermore, this paper develops a method of bootstrap inference on the LRR from the identified set for a moment inequality model, by modifying the procedure of Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) , and establishes its uniform asymptotic validity. A modification is inevitable due to the additional constraints that come from the LRR, the subvector inference, and empirical processes involved in the inference. (See, e.g., Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) and Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2017) and references therein for recent developments in subvector inference.)
There have been attempts to develop a method or criterion to choose a subset of the identified set in the literature. Song (2014) analyzed the problem of choosing a point from the identified interval based on the local asymptotic minimax regret criterion. Aryal and Kim (2013) considered an incomplete English auction model where the seller is ambiguity averse, and employing the Γ-maximin expected utility framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , suggested a point decision on the optimal reserve price. Jun and Pinkse (2017b) considered an incomplete English auction set-up similar to that in Haile and Tamer (2003) and proposed a point decision on the optimal reserve price using a maximum entropy method. Jun and Pinkse (2017a) studied a discrete two-player complete information game and established sharp identification of counterfactual predictions 3 As shown in the paper, the approach of LRR applies to causally incomplete models other than game-theoretic models, such as models involving top-coded data. of the game. Furthermore, they investigated point decisions on the probability distributions through a maximum entropy method and what they called a Dirichlet approach, and compared the two methods. In contrast, our refinement applies to a more general set-up than auction models or two-player games, and focuses on the stability of predictions from counterfactual analyses.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a general set-up of a structural model and presents examples that fit our framework. Section 3 presents the approach of LRR and provides its characterization that is useful for implementation in practice. Focusing on generic moment inequality models, Section 4 proposes subvector inference for LRR and shows its uniform asymptotic validity. Sections 5 and 6 present results from Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical application. Section 7 concludes. In the Appendix, we provide mathematical proofs.
A Counterfactual Analysis with Multiple Reduced Forms

Models with Multiple Reduced Forms
Suppose that data {(Y i , X i ) } n i=1 are drawn from the joint distribution P of (Y , X ) which obeys the following reduced form:
for some function g, and W = (X, ε), where X is observed but ε and η are not. For each value η, we regard the map g(·; η) as representing a functional-causal relationship between internal variables Y and external variables W . 4 This relationship is fully determined once the value of η is realized. Typically, ε has a structural meaning such as unobserved costs, whereas η does not and is used only as an index for a reduced form. For example, in a game-theoretic model, W = (X, ε) represents observed and unobserved payoff components and η an index for an equilibrium. The response of Y to a change in W is ambiguous unless the value of η is fixed. In this sense, there is a multiplicity of reduced forms in (3).
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Here we follow the proposal by Heckman (2010) (p.56) and use the terms internal variables and external variables. External variables are specified from outside of the structural equations as inputs, and internal variables are generated through the system of equations from the inputs. External variables are not necessarily exogenous variables. When X is correlated with ε, the variable X is called endogenous, although (X, ε) is jointly given externally as inputs, and thus is a vector of external variables. Here a reduced form refers to a system of equations where all the variables on the left hand side are internal variables and all the variables on the right hand side are external variables. Leamer (1985) pointed out that the term "exogeneity" was used in the literature in multiple different senses.
Counterfactual Analysis
We focus on a counterfactual experiment where the distribution F P of the external vector W is changed to a counterfactual oneF P . Such a counterfactual experiment includes cases where one "shuts off" the effect of a certain covariate, "fixing" of the covariate to a certain value, or changing the distribution of ε. Suppose that the counterfactual quantity of interest is generically denoted by ρ(g,F P ) which depends on (g,F P ). This quantity could be, for example, the prediction of game outcomes or expected payoffs under a counterfactual scenario. Then the identified set for ρ(g,F P ) is given by
where G P is the identified set of g in the counterfactual environment. A standard approach to perform inference is to estimate the set and make inference based on it. This approach faces multiple challenges in practice. The set of predictions can be of little use in practice, when the estimated set is too large. Construction of the set itself and statistical inference can be computationally intensive.
Examples
For brevity, we consider two examples here: a finite game of complete information and interval data with a linear model. 2.3.1. Finite Game of Complete Information. Consider the setting of a complete information N player game with binary actions, and let A be the finite action space for each player.
5 Suppose that the payoff for player i playingã ∈ A when all other players are playing a −i = (a j ) j =i is given by π i (ã, a −i , W ) for a map π i , where W = (X, ε) is a payoffrelevant characteristic vector of player i. For each a ∈ A N , we define
Hence if w belongs to T (a), a is a Nash equilibrium for the game with w, so that the set
represents the set of equilibria for the game with w. Let η be a random vector taking values in A N where the conditional distribution G(·|w) of η given w has a support in A(w). Let
be the observed action profile that comes from a Nash equilibrium η of the 5 A special case is the two player entry game used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Tamer (2003) among others.
game after the Nature draws η from G(·|w). Then, we can write
where g = [g 1 , ..., g N ] and g(w; η) = a∈A(w) 1{η = a}a.
The conditional distribution G(·|w) over η represents the equilibrium selection rule. 
It is straightforward that the identified set is given by
This model admits multiple reduced forms in the sense that when Y * > Z 1 , the structural causal relation between Y and other external variables Z 1 , Z 2 , X 1 and ε are left ambiguous. Let us assume that when Y * > Z 1 , Y is realized to be
where η is a variable taking values in [0, 1] and is potentially correlated with X 1 , Z 1 , Z 2 . Then, we can write
where X = (X 1 , Z 1 , Z 2 ), and
The distribution G of η plays a role analogous to the equilibrium selection rule in a gametheoretic model.
Locally Robust Refinement
Overview
Suppose that the reduced-form g in (3) is parametrized as follows:
where β 0 is a parameter of interest taking values in B and γ 0 is a nuisance parameter taking values in Γ. The counterfactual experiment involves changing the distribution F P of W to a counterfactual distributionF P . Let us consider the counterfactual average structural outcome:
This is the average value of outcome Y when a counterfactual change is made to the distribution of W while everything else remains the same. LetΘ P be the set of values for θ 0 = (β 0 , γ 0 ) that are permitted in a counterfactual scenario. 6 Our focus is on a subset of Θ P at which ASO θ,P (G) behaves robustly as we perturb the "equilibrium selection rule" G. The researcher usually knows little about the equilibrium selection rule G. Hence if the researcher needs to focus on a subset ofΘ P , it appears reasonable to focus on a set that gives a counterfactual prediction that is robust to perturbations of the equilibrium selection rule. More formally, let us define for each (β, γ) ∈ B × Γ,
where · denotes the Euclidean norm and N (G) is a "neighborhood" of G which is to be defined precisely later. Then, we define the subset ofΘ LRR P ⊂Θ P to be one in which the value of nuisance parameter γ is a minimizer of ASO ∆ β,γ,P (G) over γ. More specifically, for each β, if we let
where G denotes the collection of G's permitted in the model, and B P is the identified set for β 0 . We call the subsetΘ LRR P the Locally Robust Refinement (LRR) ofΘ P .
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In most cases,Θ P is taken to be the identified set for (β 0 , γ 0 ). Sometimes, though, we might be interested in a counterfactual setting which sets some of those parameters to a specific value outside of the identified set Θ P .
Despite the impression that finding the setΘ LRR P might be computationally intensive as it involves layers of optimization, it is not, due to our characterization result in the next section.
Characterization of the Locally Robust Refinement
To derive a characterization of the LRR, let us introduce some geometric structure on the space of equilibrium selection rules G. Let G be the collection of all the conditional distributions G (of η given W ) which are dominated by a measure µ such that (dG/dµ) 2 (η|w)dµ(η) < ∞ for all G ∈ G and w ∈ W, with W denoting the set W takes values from. Let us introduce the following metric on G: for G, G ∈ G,
For any K > 0, we introduce a K-sensitivity of ASO β,γ (G) as we perturb G around in its K-neighborhood:
The quantity S β,γ,P (G; K) measures the maximal rate of change of counterfactual average outcome when G is perturbed within its K-neighborhood. We search for values of nuisance parameters γ which minimize this sensitivity (up to a small constant κ.) With some small κ > 0, we define the κ-LRR set for γ corresponding to β as
where Γ P (β) = {γ ∈ Γ : (β, γ) ∈Θ P }, i.e., the set of nuisance parameters that are admitted in the counterfactual analysis together with given β. As we show below, this set does not depend on the choice of K > 0 or that of G ∈ G.
We now provide a useful characterization of the set S β,γ (G; K). For this, we define
The function ∆ β,γ (w; η) is a conditional mean-deviation form of the structural function g β,γ (w; η). This function plays a central role in the characterization result. Let us make the following assumption that guarantees that the average variability of this conditional mean-deviation is well defined.
Assumption 3.1. For each β ∈ B and γ ∈ Γ P (β), Q LRR P (β, γ) < ∞, where
In applications where we can compute g β,γ (w; η) for each value of η, we can evaluate Q LRR P (β, γ) easily. (See Section 3.3 below for examples.) The following theorem shows that the set Γ LRR P (β; κ) is fully characterized through the function Q LRR P (β, γ).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then for each β ∈ B and γ ∈ Γ P (β),
for all G ∈ G and all K > 0.
Thus the κ-LRR of γ can be rewritten as
The κ-LRR of the nuisance parameter vector γ 0 is the set of γ's which minimize the average variability of g β,γ (w; η) (around its mean) as we perturb η.
Examples
3.3.1. Entry Game with Nash Equilibria. Consider the setting of a 2x2 complete information entry games, such as the empirical setting in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) , where there are two firms, i = 1, 2, which decide to enter a market or not. The entry decisions of the firms can then be formulated as
where β 1,0 D 2 + X γ 1,0 − ε 1 represents the payoff difference for firm 1 between entering and not entering the market, D i = 1 represents the entrance decision by firm i and D i = 0 the decision not to enter by firm i. The random vectors X and ε represent respectively the observed and unobserved characteristics of firms 1 and 2 combined. The coefficients β 1,0 and β 2,0 capture strategic interactions between firms, whereas the coefficients γ 1,0 and γ 2,0 measure the roles of firm specific and market specific characteristics.
In order to find a reduced form as in (3), we first put (2009) and presents a graphical analysis of the LRR for the entry game example. In the data, the region in light blue is the region of multiple equilibria which is the set A 3,θ (X) ∩ A 4,θ (X). In our counterfactual setting involving X changed toX, this region becomes A 3,θ (X) ∩ A 4,θ (X) depicted as the dark blue rectangle in the right hand side figure.
The LRR chooses nuisance parameters in their identified set that minimize the probability mass in the dark blue region.
where
Then we can write reduced forms for Y as
Let the distribution G of η be a continuous distribution and represent the equilibrium selection rule.
7 From (14), we find that
We find the LRR by using this Q
, the game exhibits multiple equilibria. Our counterfactuals are most robust if this region is minimal. We cannot altogether disregard this region, because observations in the data may permit this region and it is possible they may arise in the counterfactual setting. Nevertheless, we can choose nuisance parameter(s) (in their identified set) that minimize the average region of multiple equilibria for the counterfactuals. (See Figure 1 for illustration of this observation.) 3.3.2. Interval Data. Let us look for Q LRR P (β, γ) for the interval data example from Section 2.3.2. From (8), we write
where x = (x 1 , z 1 , z 2 ). We take G to be a continuous distribution on [0, 1] with the domination measure µ taken to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Thus, we find that
The constant factor 1/12 comes from the variance of the uniform distribution on [0, 1] which we can ignore when we compute Γ LRR P (β; κ). In this example, the multiplicity of reduced forms stems from the lack of observations between Z 1 and Z 2 . Therefore, the most robust counterfactual scenario is one in which the probability of the outcome lying in the interval [Z 1 , Z 2 ] is minimal. The LRR minimizes this probability. We cannot set such probability to be 0, because it is inconsistent with data. Instead of taking G to be a continuous distribution, we may consider it to be a discrete distribution with a support {0, 1}. Then the dominating measure µ is taken to be a counting measure on {0, 1} instead of the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. With this change, Q LRR P (β, γ) becomes a constant multiple of the expression on the right hand side of (20). Thus the LRR remains invariant with this change of G into a discrete distribution. 8
In the case described above, X 1 is binary and we have that:
The inequalities in the definition of Θ P yield the parallelogram shown in gray.
(A) Example 1 (B) Example 2 FIGURE 2. Locally Robust Refinement for the Interval Data Case
Notes: The figure presents two examples of the LRR for the interval data model. These examples are inspired by the empirical example of Romano and Shaikh (2010) . In particular, X 1,i = (1, X 1,2,i ), with X 1,2,i a binary discrete random variable (e.g. gender). Under this set-up, θ = (β, γ), the parameter of interest is the intercept (β) and the nuisance parameter is the slope (γ). The identified set for those parameters is given by adapting equation (7), which defines a parallelogram shown in dark gray 8 . In counterfactuals which change X 1,2 , the identified set changes to the one in light gray, although it remains a parallelogram. The LRR picks γ that minimizes (21). Here, this means picking γ equal to the red dot. It follows that the LRR for β (in bold red on the y-axis) is the projection on the y-axis of the counterfactual identified set (light gray) evaluated at this selected γ (red dot). It is smaller than the original identified set for β (in bold black).
Nevertheless, we can at least choose our nuisance parameters that minimize it. This is shown graphically with two examples in Figure 2 Suppose that the parameters θ = (β, γ) are identified as
where Q P (β, γ) is a nonnegative population function of parameters which depends on the distribution P of observed variables. (We will see an example of Q P in moment inequality models later.) 9 A standard way of doing inference on β (based on profiling) is as follows.
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When the minimum value of the objective function is not zero, we can redefine
LetQ(β, γ) be the sample analogue of Q P (β, γ). Then, we define a profiled statistic:
where a n is a normalizing sequence. For the confidence set, let ζ(β) be a random variable whose distribution approximates T (β), and let c 1−α (β) be the 1 − α percentile from the distribution of ζ(β). Then the confidence region for β is given by
The idea of inference using profiling goes back to at least Barndorff-Nielsen (1983) . Romano and Shaikh (2008) proposed subvector inference on the identified set with a profiling approach. The profiling approach was substantially extended by Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) . See also Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2017) for a different method of subvector inference.
Our inference on LRR is a modified version of such a profiling approach. First, we define for a small number κ > 0,
(In practice one can choose a small number such as κ = 0.0025.) Then we let a κ-LRR set for β be as follows:
Thus the counterfactual setting that we focus on is one where β 0 ∈ B LRR P (κ). To construct a confidence set for β 0 in this set-up, we take the following steps.
Step 1: We takê
10 We take 2κ here instead of κ to cover the samping variations ofQ LRR (β, γ) so that the asymptotic validity of the procedure is ensured.
Step 2: We construct a test statistic with γ profiled out with a constraint:
Let ζ LRR (β) be a random variable whose distribution approximates that of T LRR (β) (with large samples), and let c LRR 1−α (β) be the 1 − α percentile from the distribution of ζ LRR (β).
Then the confidence region for β is given by
Typically C LRR 1−α is substantially smaller than C 1−α . As for c 
Inference from Moment Inequality Models
While the subvector inference with the LRR constraint applies more generally, we focus here on moment inequality models for the sake of concreteness. We apply the constrained profiling approach of subvector inference to the moment inequality models. For this, let us consider the following moment inequality models:
.., p, and
We assume that the moment restrictions define the identified set Θ P so that for all θ ∈ Θ P , the moment restrictions are satisfied. Define
We let for each q ≥ 1,Q
and [a] + = max{a, 0}, a ∈ R. Then, we construct T LRR (β) as in (25) with a n = n q/2 .
As for critical values, we may consider two different approaches. The first approach is based on least favorable configurations. The second approach is a more refined version with enhanced power properties but with a higher computational cost.
As for the first approach, we consider the following:
11 for q ≥ 1,
and W * i 's are resampled from the empirical distribution of W i 's with replacement. Let
We take critical valuesĉ 1−α (β) to be the (1−α)100%-percentile of the bootstrap distribution ofT LRR * (β).
As for the second approach, there are various alternative ways to construct inference that improves upon the one that is based on least favorable configurations. For example, one may use moment selection procedures as in Hansen (2005), Andrews and Soares (2010) and Andrews and Shi (2013) , or the contact set method in Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) , or a Bonferroni-based procedure as in Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) . Here we use the latter because formulating low level conditions is simpler with their approach in our context. However, we cannot directly use their proofs, because their procedure involves neither empirical processes nor subvector inference as ours does.
First, we take 0 < α 1 < α (say, α 1 = 0.005) and findκ α 1 (θ) such that
where P denotes the collection of distributions of W i that satisfies the assumptions in the model. We can obtainκ α 1 (θ) using bootstrap by taking the (1 − α 1 )100%-th percentile from the bootstrap distribution of
using m * j (θ) defined in (29). The uniform asymptotic validity of such a bootstrap procedure is well known in the literature. (See also Section 8.3 in the Appendix for details.) Definê
As compared toQ * (β, γ) in (29),Q * (β, γ) involves the additional termλ j,α 1 (θ) which is always non-positive, and substantially negative when m j (θ) is so. This makes the critical value based on the bootstrap distribution ofQ * (β, γ) tend to be smaller than that from Q * (β, γ), making the inference less conservative. We construct a bootstrap test statistic as
We take critical valuesĉ 1−α+α 1 (β) to be the (1 − α + α 1 )100%-percentile of the bootstrap distribution ofT LRR * (β). Then, we construct the confidence region for β 0 as follows:
Uniform Asymptotic Validity
This section is devoted to proving the uniform validity of the inference on LRR. We first assume the following. 
(ii) For each α 1 ∈ (0, 1),κ α 1 satisfies (30). Assumption 4.1(i) is a mild condition which requires uniform consistency of the sample criterion function for the LRR (uniform in θ ∈ Θ and P ∈ P). Typically, Q LRR P (β, γ) takes the following form:
for some map q. LetF (x) andq(x; β, γ) be the estimated versions ofF P (x) and q(x; β, γ) using which we constructQ
Thus, we can find lower level conditions for (35) in terms ofF (x) andq(x; β, γ). Assumption 4.1(ii) is typically satisfied when we takeκ α 1 (θ) from the bootstrap distribution of (31). (For example, see Andrews and Shi (2013) , Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) , and Lee, Song, and Whang (2018) .) We let
where Var P denotes the variance under P . Let
Let us make the following assumption. 
(ii) There exists C > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and any θ ∈ Θ,
(iii) Θ is compact. Assumption 4.2(i) is a uniform moment condition. Assumption 4.2(ii) imposes the condition of L 2 -equicontinuity on the functionμ i,j,P (θ). This condition, similar in spirit to Chen, Linton, and Van Keilegom (2003) , is used to verify the asymptotic equicontinuity of the empirical process involved inQ(β, γ) and its bootstrap version.
We now introduce an assumption on the limit Gaussian process of the empirical process. First, let us introduce some notation. Let {ν j,P (θ) : θ ∈ Θ} be a Gaussian process having covariance function equal to Cov P (µ i,j,P (θ), µ i,j,P (θ )), θ, θ ∈ Θ. Let for M > 0,
where r = (r j ) p j=1 is a vector of real measurable maps on Θ. Define 
as ε → 0, where B LRR P (κ) is as defined in (23).
This condition is a mild regularity condition for the Gaussian process ν P , which is generically satisfied because the Gaussian process has an unbounded support. (Note that R M is a collection of vectors of functions that are bounded between −M and 0.) The assumption can be violated when ν j,P (θ) has zero variance at some point θ = (β, γ) such that γ ∈ Γ LRR P (β). The following theorem gives the uniform asymptotic validity of the confidence region C LRR 1−α defined in (34). Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold. Then,
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is found in the Appendix. For the proof of uniform asymptotic validity, we approximate the bootstrap distribution by an appropriately truncated version of a functional of a Gaussian process. This facilitates the use of the continuous mapping theorem in Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) which does not require that the continuous functionals have a well defined limit.
Monte Carlo Simulations
Simulation Design
In this section, we present results from a Monte Carlo simulation study on the finite sample properties of the inference procedure developed previously. We focus on the interval data example considered in Section 3.3.2. That is, while the true model is Y * = X 1 θ 0 + ε, the researcher does not observe Y * when Y * > Z 1 only knowing it belongs to [Z 1 , Z 2 ]. We draw ε from the standard normal distribution. For these simulations, we consider a simple set-up similar to the empirical example in Romano and Shaikh (2010) . Let X 1 be a 2-dimensional object, where X 1,i = [1,X i ], wherẽ X i is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with probability p = 0.5. Hence, p represents the share of a gender, race or a discrete characteristic in the population. The researcher may want to study the gender-wage gap in the presence of top-coded data (i.e. the parameter of interest is β, the slope coefficient), or study the average effect of a job training program when there are different characteristics (in this case, the parameter of interest β is the coefficient on the intercept). We focus on the latter situation by setting our parameter of interest (β) to be the intercept (coefficient on 1), and γ to be the coefficient onX i . The identified set is characterized by two sets of moment inequalities in (7).
We consider two cases: one case where parameters (β, γ) are such that the moments are close to equalities, and the other case where they are not. For the first case, we set (β, γ, Z 1 , Z 2 ) = (−1.2, 2, 2.5, 3). We call this set-up least favorable. 12 The second case uses parameter values for (β, γ, Z 1 , Z 2 ) = (0, 2, 2.5, 4) so that the moment inequalities are far from binding. For both cases, we show results with and without using LRR. Furthermore, we show the results with and without the Bonferroni-based modification proposed by Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014). In both cases, for the LRR, we construct the statistic T LRR (β) following Step 2 in (25) with κ = 0.0025, a n = n q/2 , and q = 1. The confidence interval follows the computation in (34). We set the nominal size at 0.05, the simulation number to 1000, and the bootstrap number to 999.
Results
The results, both for the coverage probability and the length of the confidence interval are shown in Table 1 . The results show that the average length of the confidence interval decreases with n, and this decrease is conspicuous when we use the LRR. Furthermore, the refinement substantially reduces the confidence interval length when compared to the confidence interval without LRR. This is partly due to considering only a subset of the identified set instead of the full set. As a result, our approach is computationally cheaper than other approaches. As expected with a profiling approach, the inference exhibits conservative coverage probabilities in both specifications, with and without the LRR.
The Bonferroni-based modification proposed by Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) reduces the length of the confidence intervals but only marginally in our simulation setup. As expected, this modification is most effective, when the DGP is away from the least favorable configuration. However, this modification comes at the computational cost of calculating the term κ α 1 via a bootstrap procedure for every value of θ in a first step. This step could be time consuming when the dimension of θ is large. Figure 3 shows the stability of the LRR as we perturb the equilibrium selection. The result is based on the set-up of the "Non-Least Favorable Case" of Table 1 with n = 200, where we consider different values of η = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} (i.e. different distributions of η with mass points at those values), which represent various scenarios of the distributions of income that we do not observe (above Z 1 ). The counterfactual predictions change with η, because the realized values of Y * become closer to Z 1 as η increases. This decreases the average counterfactual effect (as it decreases Y * ).
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12 If we used the true γ and no profiling, we would find coverage probability close to 95%. This is what we find in simulations, with the results available from the authors due to space considerations. 13 Note that changing the distribution of η does not affect the confidence set for β (with or without LRR) in this particular example. This is because the distribution of η only affects the outcomes Y * for observations above the threshold Z 1 . However, we do not actually observe those outcomes above Z 1 . We only use the mass Notes: The first half of the table reports the empirical coverage probability of the confidence interval for β computed with the bootstrap procedure described in the main text, and the second half reports its average length. "Bonferroni Mod." represents Bonferroni-based modification proposed by Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) in inference on moment inequality restrictions. The columns with "Conservative" correspond to not using this modification. For the least favorable case, we use parameter values β = −1.2, γ = 2, Z 1 = 2.5, Z 2 = 3 which yield moment inequalities that are very close to be binding. For the second specification, we set β = 0, γ = 2, Z 1 = 2.5 and Z 2 = 4, which yields moment inequalities that are far from binding. In each case, we present results for sample sizes of n = 200, 1000, with bootstrap number B = 999 and the simulation number R = 1000.
As shown in Figure 3 , the average value of the counterfactual Y varies less across specifications when we use LRR compared to not using LRR (the LRR mean prediction varies from -0.91 to -0.81, compared to -1.41 to -1.21 for the identified set). This is a result of the robustness property of LRR. The mean predictions vary less with LRR than without. Furthermore, there is a smaller range of counterfactual effects predicted by LRR, and this range also varies less than without the refinement. Thus the LRR delivers stable predictions across specifications.
Empirical Application: Top-Coded Data
We provide an empirical application to illustrate how our procedure works with data. The application considers the case of top coded data, as in the Monte Carlo. We use the of observations above Z 1 , which does not change with η. This can be seen by equation (21) whose minimizer defines LRR and in equation (7) for the identified set. Neither expression includes G or η. Nevertheless, η still affects the counterfactual outcome because we report the counterfactual outcome Y * (including the values of Y * above Z 1 ).
FIGURE 3. Robustness of Counterfactual Predictions -With and Without LRR
Notes: The figure presents the average counterfactual outcomes (Y ) with and without the LRR over a range of different specifications (η = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}). The simulation set-up is β = 0, γ = −1.2, Z 1 = 2.5, Z 2 = 4 (the non-least favorable case of Table 1 above), and sample size n = 200, 100 simulations and bootstrap number B = 999. The solid lines represent the average range of counterfactual outcomes predicted in simulations, while the circle presents the mean of that range. The LRR case (in red) has a mean and range of effects that vary less than when one considers the full identified set (in black).
data from the 2000 Annual Demographic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and follow the set-up from Romano and Shaikh (2010) . That is, we keep individuals who are college graduates between 20 and 24 of age, white, with a primary source of income that is wages and salaries and that worked at least 2 hours per week on average. This results in a sample of 305 individuals. Differently than their work, however, we do not assume that this sample is a "true" probability distribution for simulations. We use the data as an empirical application instead, where we do not know the true probability distribution or the values of the parameters. We also explore the effects of different amounts of top coding on the results. We maintain our assumption from the Monte Carlo simulation that we are interested in the intercept of the regression Y i = X 1,i θ + ε i , and X 1,i is two-dimensional (constant, and the variable gender). We are interested in comparing the confidence set for β without using LRR and that using LRR. We use this data under different top coding amounts in this sample (5% or 10%), as well as different values of the top possible wages (Z 2 ∈ {10 6 , 10 8 }).
The results are shown in Table 2 . The confidence interval for β becomes substantially shorter, when we focus on inference on its LRR. For this problem, the confidence intervals for β are largest when there is more top coding and when Z 2 is largest, meaning there is less information about the unobserved incomes. Notes: The table shows the results of the confidence interval for β without using LRR and using LRR. The results are obtained without using the Bonferroni-based modification. The bootstrap number is B = 999. The nominal size is α = 0.05.
Conclusion
This paper explores methods to deal with models with multiple reduced forms for counterfactual analysis. As mentioned by Eizenberg (2014) , there is an inherent tradeoff within the partial identification literature: while researchers may prefer not to impose strong identifying assumptions, they must confront the issue of counterfactuals with larger identified sets when doing policy analysis.
Our proposal to use LRR provides an alternative for researchers who are faced with set identified counterfactuals that are too large, but do not have justifiable prior information to use in choosing what subsets to focus on. The refinement looks at the subset of counterfactual scenarios that give most reliable predictions against a range of perturbations of the reduced forms (such as through changing equilibrium selection rules). It is shown to have attractive features, including computational tractability, robustness and an intuitive appeal. We develop a uniformly asymptotically valid inference approach based on subvector inference and find that the procedure has good finite sample properties, and can be applied to the data and produce meaningful results.
Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let U and W be the sets η and W = (X, ε) take values from respectively. Let H be the collection of measurable maps h : W × U such that h(w, η)dµ(η) = 0,F P -a.s., and
We endow the inner-product ·, · with H as follows: for h 1 , h 2 ∈ H,
Then (H, ·, · ) is a Hilbert space (up to an equivalence class). Define h 2 = h, h and write
and
If we define
we can write
where the first equality comes because dG /dµ − dG/dµ ∈ H and the last inequality comes by (44) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since h β,γ ∈ H by Assumption 3.1, the last bound is achieved once we take h in the supremum to be Kh β,γ / h β,γ above inequality and hence the last inequality is in fact an equality. The last term is nothing but K Q LRR P (β, γ), completing the proof.
8.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1 8.2.1. Auxiliary Results. We introduce a theorem that gives the weak convergence of a stochastic process to a tight limit along a given sequence of probabilities. This result is based on Section 2.8.3 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) . We modify the results slightly because in our case the class of functions that index an empirical process depends on the underlying distribution P ∈ P.
Let T be a given set and let f j,P (·; τ ) : R d → R, j = 1, ..., k, be a function indexed by τ ∈ T , potentially depending on P ∈ P. Define for each j = 1, ..., k, F j,P = {f j,P (·; τ ) : τ ∈ T }, and
where f P (·; τ ) = [f 1,P (·; τ ), ..., f k,P (·; τ )] . Given i.i.d. random vectors X i , we introduce a stochastic process on T :
We let ∞ (T ) be the set of bounded R k -valued functions on T , and · ∞ denote the sup norm on
, where · denotes the Euclidean norm in R k . We introduce a semimetric ρ P on T as follows:
Define the class of bouned Lipschitz functionals:
) be the ε-bracketing entropy of F P with respect to the L 2 (P ) norm, which is the smallest number N of the brackets
such that each f ∈ F P satisfies j ≤ f ≤ u j for some [ j , u j ] and j − u j P,2 ≤ ε. (The inequalities required of the brackets are point-wise inequalities when f is R k -valued.)
We also define P * and E * P to be the outer-probability and and outer-expectation under P . (See van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) , Section 1.2 for details.) The following theorem formulates conditions for the weak convergence of ν n,P to a tight Gaussian limit uniformly over P ∈ P.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose that the two conditions are satisfied.
(i) For each j = 1, ..., k, there exists a measurable envelope F j,P for F j,P such that
where ν P is a Gaussian process with covariance kernel given by
Proof: By following the proof of Theorem 2.8.4 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) , we find that Conditions (i) and (ii) give the asymptotic equicontinuity of the following form:
and (T , ρ P ) is totally bounded uniformly over P ∈ P in the sense that for any ε > 0, and any P ∈ P there exists an m ε number of ε-open balls (with respect to ρ P ) that cover T where m ε does not depend on P . Then both the results of (53) and (54) follow by Theorem 2.6 of Giné and Zinn (1991) .
We consider a bootstrap version of Theorem 8.1. Given a sample {X 1 , ..., X n }, we let G n be the σ-field generated by this sample. LetP be the empirical measure of {X 1 , ..., X n }, and {X * 1 , ..., X * n } i.i.d. draws fromP . First, define
which is the bootstrap counterpart of ν n,P .
Theorem 8.2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 8.1 are satisfied. Then for any
as n → ∞, where ν P is the Gaussian process in Theorem 8.1.
Proof:
The proof basically follows that of Lemma A.2 of Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) . The only difference here is that the class F P depends on P . As seen in the proof of Theorem 8.1, (T , ρ P ) is totally bounded uniformly over P ∈ P. Thus for any given ε > 0, there is a map π ε : T → T which takes m ε values and ρ P (π ε τ, τ ) ≤ ε. Take any f ∈ BL 1 , and consider
The last term vanishes uniformly in f ∈ BL 1 as ε → 0 by (54). By using the proof of Lemma 2.1 in Giné and Zinn (1991) , p.763, and the moment condition (51) to handle the remainder part of the process that is left over from truncation, we can show that the second term on the right hand side vanishes in probability uniformly over P ∈ P as n → ∞. We deal with the first term using Le Cam's Poissonization lemma and following the proof of Theorem 2.2 of Giné (1997), p.104. 14 Indeed, we define T (ε, ρ P ) = {τ 1 − τ 2 : ρ P (τ 1 , τ 2 ) < ε}, and note that
where N i is i.i.d. Poisson random variables with mean 1 independent of all the other random variables. By Theorem 8.1, both terms on the right hand, after taking supremum over P ∈ P, vanish as n → ∞ and ε → 0.
The following lemma is the bootstrap version of Lemma A.1 of Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) . The proof of the lemma can be proceeded similarly as in the proof of Lemma A.1 of Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) using (56) and is omitted.
Lemma 8.1. Suppose that the bootstrap empirical process ν * n,P satisfies (56) for any ε > 0. Let f n,P be a continuous functional on ∞ (T ) that is potentially G n -measurable such that for some possibly G n -measurable number C n,P ∈ R,
and for each c ∈ A for some set A ⊂ R,
Then, for each c ∈ A and each ε > 0, lim sup
8.2.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1. For simplicity, we consider only the case with k = p so that there is no equality restrictions in the model. Define
where Γ LRR P (β; κ) is as defined in (22) andQ(β, γ) is as defined in (27). Let us consider the pseudo confidence interval:
where c LRR 1−α,P (β; κ) is 1 − α percentile of the bootstrap distribution of
andQ * (β, γ) is as defined in (33). For the lemmas below, we assume that the conditions of Theorem 4.1 hold. Recall that we write θ = (β, γ) ∈ Θ generically.
Lemma 8.2.
as n → ∞.
We can show this using Assumption 4.2(i) and (ii) and following the same steps in the proof of Lemma D.2 of Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2015) . Details are omitted.
Let us take for j = 1, ..., p,
, and (65)ν
and letν n,P = [ν n,1,P , ...,ν n,p,P ] , andν n,P = [ν n,1,P , ...,ν n,p,P ] . Similarly, we also take for
Lemma 8.3. There exists a tight Borel measurable Gaussian process ν P on Θ such that
and for each ε > 0,
Proof: For the first statement, we use Theorem 8.1, and verify the conditions there. To map the current set-up to that of Theorem 8.1, we take T = Θ and set, identifying τ = θ ∈ Θ, f j,P (W i , τ ) = m j (W i ; θ)/σ j,P (θ). Condition (i) of the theorem follows by Assumption 4.2(i), and Condition (ii) by Assumption 4.2(ii) and the assumption that Θ is compact. Thus (67) follows by Theorem 8.1. By Theorem 8.2, the second statement follows similarly.
We define
Let for some constant M > 0,
Let us also define
Lemma 8.4. For any ν ∈ ∞ (Θ), and n ≥ 1,
Proof: Since we can bound
it suffices to show that
A j,M (ν), and
For each j = 1, ..., p and θ ∈ Θ P , the absolute difference
is zero if q n,j,P (θ) ≥ −M . Suppose that q n,j,P (θ) < −M . Then the difference is again zero if ν j (θ) ≤ M . Thus, we obtain the first statement in (73). As for the second statement, note that for each j = 1, ..., p and θ ∈ Θ P , the difference
is not zero only if [ν j + max{q n,j,P , −M }] + (θ) ≥ M . Since max{q n,j,P (θ), −M } ≤ 0 for each θ ∈ Θ P , the latter inequality implies that |ν j (θ)| ≥ M . Thus we obtain the second statement. As for the third statement in (73), the difference between
The union of the latter two events, under q n,j,P (θ) ≤ −M , is contained in the event
Lemma 8.5. The following holds for each ε, η > 0, as n → ∞ and M → ∞.
Proof: (i) By the first statement of Lemma 8.3, we find that
By Lemma 8.4, it suffices to show that for any ε > 0 and any j = 1, ..., p,
However, the last probability is bounded by
for some C > 0, where · ψ 2 denotes the Orlicz norm with ψ 2 (x) = exp(x 2 ) − 1, and a , a ∈ R, represents the smallest integer that is not smaller than a. The first inequality follows because for any random variable X and p ≥ 1, X 2p ≤ p! X ψ 2 . The last inequality follows from the proof of Corollary 2.2.8 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) and the bracketing entropy bound which comes from Assumption 4.2 and the assumption that Θ is compact. The last term in (78) vanishes as M → ∞.
(ii) The second statement follows similarly by the second statement of Lemma 8.3.
Proof: Letr j,P (θ) = max{q n,j,P (θ), −M }1{θ ∈ Θ P }, θ ∈ Θ. Thenr j,P ∈ R M for each j = 1, ..., p, and the desired result follows by Assumption 4.3.
Lemma 8.7. For each M > 0 and η ∈ (0, pM q /2),
and, for each ε > 0, P {h n,M,P (ν n,P )(β) ≤ c} − P {h n,M,P (ν P )(β) ≤ c} → 0 (81) for each c ∈ [η, pM q −η]. Due to Assumption 4.3, we can elevate this pointwise convergence with uniformity over c ∈ [η, pM q − η] by using the same arguments in the proof of Lemma 2.11 of van der Vaart (1998), p.12. Using Lemmas 8.3 and 8.1, we can follow the same arguments to obtain the second statement for the bootstrap empirical process.
Recall the definition of T LRR P (β; κ) in (62) and let its CDF be denoted by J n,P (·; β). Let for each q ≥ 1,Q
which is different fromQ(β, γ) in that it involves σ j,P in place ofσ j . Let (β, γ) = h n,P (ν n,P )(β),
recalling the definition of h n,P in (70). Let us denote the CDF ofT LRR P (β; κ) byJ n,P (·; β) and the conditional CDF of T LRR * P (β; κ) given G n by J * n,P (·; β). (Recall the definition of T LRR * P (β; κ) in (64).) We also definẽ T LRR * P (β; κ) = h n,P (ν * n )(β),
and let its conditional CDF given G n be denoted byJ * n (·; β). Letc LRR 1−α,P (β; κ) be the 1 − α percentile of the bootstrap distribution ofT LRR * P (β; κ). Lemma 8.8. Suppose that {P n } ⊂ P be a given sequence and β n ∈ B LRR Pn (κ), n ≥ 1. Then lim inf n→∞ P n T LRR Pn (β n ; κ) ≥c
Proof: By Theorem 2.4 (iii) and Lemmas S.5.1 and S.5.2 of the supplemental note of Romano and Shaikh (2012) and Assumption 4.2, it suffices to show that for any ε > 0, and for any sequence β n ∈ B, P n sup x∈R J n,Pn (x; β n ) −J * n,Pn (x; β n ) > ε → 0,
as n → ∞. For the statement, it suffices to show that as n → ∞, sup x∈R J n,Pn (x; β n ) −J ∞ n,Pn (x; β n ) → 0,
and for any ε > 0, P n sup x∈R J * n,Pn (x; β n ) −J ∞ n,Pn (x; β n ) > ε → 0, (87) whereJ ∞ n,Pn (x; β) denotes the CDF of h n,Pn (ν Pn )(β) and ν Pn is the Gaussian process in (40) with P replaced by P n . The statement (86) 
because q n,j,P (θ) ≤ 0 for θ ∈ Θ P . By Lemma 8.3, h n,P (ν n,P )(β) is uniformly tight uniformly over P ∈ P, and thus we have the desired result.
(ii) Note that sup P ∈P sup β∈B P {P {h n,P (ν n,P )(β) ≥ M ε |G n } > ε} ≤ sup P ∈P sup β∈B P {P {|h n,P (ν n,P )(β) ≥ M ε |G n } − P {h n,P (ν P )(β) ≥ M ε } | > ε/2} + sup P ∈P sup β∈B 1 {P {h n,P (ν P )(β) ≥ M ε } > ε/2} .
The first supremum on the right hand side goes to zero as n → ∞ by Lemma 8.3. By (88) and the tightness of the Gaussian process, we can choose a large M ε such that the last term becomes zero from some large n on. [ν j + min{ν j + q n,j,P +κ α 1 , 0}]
where q n,j,P is as defined in (69). By Assumption 4.1 (ii), and since q n,j,P (θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ P , lim inf n→∞ P n ĥ α 1 ,n,P (ν * n )(β n ) ≥ h n,P (ν * n )(β n ) ≥ 1 − α 1 .
Note thatĥ α 1 ,n,P (ν * n )(β n ) = T LRR * P (β n ; κ). By definition, there exists a subsequence {n k } ⊂ {n} such that lim inf
Along the subsequence {n k }, we have from (8.2): for any ε > 0,
This implies that
as k → ∞, becauseT LRR Pn k (β n k ; κ) = h n k ,P (ν n k ,P )(β) is uniformly tight by Lemma 8.10. Similarly for the bootstrap, we have
along {P n k } as k → ∞ by Lemma 8.10. From Lemma 8.8, we find that the last limit in (91) is bounded from below by 1 − α. The desired result follows by Lemma 8.9.
